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Abstract - The security of a system cannot be certified unless 
there are formal methods of admission control. Many techniques 
and protocol have been proposed that try to provide security yet 
do not focus on the most important question about who has 
access to the system. When considering group communications it 
is more important to understand this problem as the security of 
the system is dependent upon having authorized entities in the 
group communicating securely. Admission control has previously 
been studied indistributed systems but repeatedly overlooked in 
security. In this paper we provide a polling centred admission 
control system based on ICMetrics. We choose the polling based 
system as it considers the opinion of current group members 
when giving access to members wishing to join the group. Our 
proposed protocol is based on the use of the secure ring signature 
along with the latest ICMetrics technology. 
Keywords– ICMetrics; admission control; polling; ring 
signatures; group secure communications, group security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Secure group communications offer a unique environment 
that is composed of many clients communicating securely in a 
group. The complexity here is the availability of multiple 
points of attack and an overall environment where clients may 
join or leave a group at any moment. Since there are multiple 
clients involved thereforethe prevailing complexity at the 
architectural level requires the design and implementation of 
strict and robust security protocols [1]. 
Much research work has been done in designing security 
protocols that address the essential security goals of 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation. 
Most proposed protocols try to fulfill the above requirements 
by using modern cryptographic techniques [2]. Security 
protocols can be considered fairly robust and secure but they 
miss out on a major detail i.e. admission control. Admission 
control is an area of research that has been missed out in its 
entirety when considering security protocols [3]. Some may 
argue that the requirements of admission control are already 
being fulfilled by the post admission protocols. The important 
fact is that admission control activities should begin before an 
entity applies to become part of a group communication. 
Admission control in a group setting is important because 
without this element of security there is no way of insuring 
who is part of the group. In the absence of an admission control 
methods the group is at the mercy of malicious or dishonest 
participants. Group admissions is composed of but not limited 
to the following crucial activities: 
• Define method of admission (permission, polling, access 
control list). 
• New member verification. 
• Verification of counterpart/group. 
• Obtaining permission for admission from existing 
members. 
To this end we present a description of what types of 
groups exist and what their individual characteristics are. 
Section III then discusses the techniques through which 
admission can be obtained. A description of the ICmetrics 
technology is preceded by a detailed description of the building 
blocks of the protocol. Section VII provides a detailed 
description of the proposed admission scheme using a step by 
step breakdown of how ring signatures are generated using 
ICMetrics. In the end the paper analyzes the proposed security 
scheme from an information security standpoint. 
II. TYPES OF GROUPS 
Secure group communications require first the formation 
of a group. The type of group dictates the level of security 
dispensed to the group. Some clients may require a group that 
allows them to communicate openly without security 
provisions while others may require a very secure group that 
provides the highest level of security. Once a group is 
established it is not possible to lower the security level of a 
group by converting it to a less restrictive group. Below we 
discuss the types of groups and their features. 
 
 
A. Public Groups/ Open Groups 
Public groups are those groups that are open to the public. 
Mostly these groups do not have a formal admission control 
procedure hence any client can connect to the group and 
communicate. The content of the group, members of the group 
are all visible to the public. These groups can be used for 
communicating insecurely within a group. The advantage of 
these groups is that they allow collaborations among clients 
without the security overhead. These groups are established 
for those clients that wish to collaborate insecurely much like 
a public chat. 
B. Restricted Groups 
Restricted group are more secure when compared to public 
groups. The contents and members of the restricted group are 
only visible to the registered/ admitted members of the group. 
This implies that a formal group admission policy is put into 
place and the clients are given admission following group 
members or group controller’s permission. Hence mandatory 
access controls are defined for obtaining access to a group. 
Once a client has left the group he will not have access to 
future communications in the group. These groups can be 
resource (time, memory) demanding as there are multiple 
policies like admissions and departures, keying, rekeying and 
finally key structuring. Forecasting the resource demand can 
be difficult since the size of the group has primary influence 
on the amount of resources required. 
C. Private Groups 
Private groups provide the highest level of security 
because these groups are purely invitation based. Other 
possible variants also include a friend to friend architecture 
where a client can only communicate with the persons it 
invites into the group. There may be many clients in the group 
but a client can communicate with only those who it has 
invited. This feature strengthens the security provisions within 
clusters inside a group. A common concern for clients in a 
group is that they are always at the risk of being exposed due 
to clients that have gone rogue in the group. Defining a circle 
of friends provides better protection from rogue clients. This 
technique does not entirely eliminate rogue clients from the 
group. Examples of these groups are commonly seen in a 
social networking environment.  
III. ADMISSION MECHANISMS 
Before formally presenting the admission control we 
present the basic elements of the protocol. 
Obtaining group membership requires identification and 
authentication procedures so that impersonation can be 
prevented. Admission to a group can be obtained by multiple 
methods like polling upon request, invitation and access 
control list. The choice of technique is based on the type of 
group and how the members wish to get registered. 
 
A. Polling Upon Request 
Polling based admission control procedures allow a 
prospective member to be admitted into the group if the 
existing members vote in its favour [4] [5]. A polling request 
is executed by taking a random subset of clients from the 
entire group population. The selected clients will poll in 
favour or against the admission of the new client. An 
important measure to be established while voting is the 
quorum. The quorum defines the minimum number of 
favourable votes that will allow an expecting client entry into 
the system. 
The polling request is an efficient mechanism as obtaining 
permission from all clients in large sized groups can be very 
time consuming. The selected candidates will form a small 
subset that will be representing the entire population of the 
group. 
B. Access Control List 
An access control list (ACL) provides a simple yet strict 
method of control that is frequently seen in networks, file 
systems and database administration [6]. Using an ACL the 
members of a group name those clients that will be allowed 
admission into the group. In secure group communications 
only a single inbound access control list is sufficient. Unlike 
many network protocols that use an inbound and an outbound 
traffic access control list. Once a client tries to gain access to 
the group it is the group controller’s responsibility to process 
the ACL top-down to determine if the incoming request for 
admission should be entertained. 
C. Timed Invitations 
Another method of controlling admissions is through the 
use of a timed invitation. This technique is employed by 
private groups and is considered secure because only present 
group clients can invite other members into the group. After 
they accept the invitation the new members undergo a formal 
identification and authentication process. Timed invitations 
are initiated when a group client sends an invitation to a 
member who should “consider” joining the group in a secure 
conversation. Each invitation is time based and has a definite 
time within which it can be accepted. Just before sending the 
invitation the client requests the group controller to add the 
expected incoming member into the ACL along with a future 
time stamp after which the group controller will remove the 
clients name from the ACL. Thus prohibiting access to the 
group until another invitation is not sent. 
Having a time based invitation has the added advantage of 
preventing an open ended access mechanism where an 
invitation can be used fraudulently. 
IV. KEYING PERSPECTIVES 
Keying in group communications is a complex task owing 
to the existence of large number of group members. 
Depending upon the architecture one must choose between 
controller based keying or the collaborative client based 
keying mechanism. Although many protocols exist for both of 
the above techniques but they do not study the problem of 
admission control. When adopting a polling based system we 
note that selected existing clients have a choice whether to let 
a client join the group or not. The group admission procedure 
should not allow an intending client to find out who voted in 
his favour and who voted against him. The sole purpose of the 
polling procedure is to allow or deny admission regardless of 
who voted in favour and who voted against an entities 
admission. Hence group admission should protect the identity 
and opinion of the voters. 
A technique that promises such functionality is the Ring 
signature. Originally proposed by Rivest et al [7], it allows a 
group member to leak a secret from a group by using a 
verifiable signature. Their scenario is based on the fact that 
one may wish to leak a secret that is signed but the signature 
should not link the secret to the exact entity. Seemingly ring 
signatures have no association with group admissions. Upon 
further investigation we discover the need for a polling 
method that allows group members to poll for an intending 
member without their opinion or identity being exposed. 
V. INTEGRATED CIRCUIT METRICS (ICMETRICS) 
Ever since security has been designed it has been based on 
the use of a key which is essential in decrypting of text. Just 
like modern cryptography ancient cryptographic techniques 
like the Freemason cipher, rail fence cipher and many others 
were also based on the use of keys [7]. These keys if leaked 
can cause system infiltration and this is why every effort is 
made to keep the keys as confidential as possible. Although 
these keys are crucial for providing security, these keys have 
no relationship with their owner. A person is for instance 
recognized by his fingerprint but a key pair has no relation 
with its system. ICMetrics advocates the generation of security 
data that is based on characteristics of a device. Every device 
has a unique hardware and software environment. Consider 
two devices having the same model and manufacturer. Even 
though these devices physically look the same they have vast 
differences in their internal environments. Some of the unique 
features that can be used for generating an ICMetric basis 
number are serial numbers, addresses, program counter data, 
data in the RAM, data in the cache and other similar features 
that can be used to distinguish one device from the other. 
ICMetrics supports this notion and encourages the use of 
unique characteristics to generate an ID for every device [9]. 
ICMetrics is a vast paradigm shift as compared to the 
conventional information security. ICMetrics can be 
considered more secure because of the following points. 
• ICMetrics is both hardware and software based. 
• The ICMetric basis number is generated from unique 
characteristics found on the system. 
• The ICMetric basis number does not need to be stored on 
the system as it can be generated in real time. 
• Any attempt to physically alter/ vandalize the system will 
cause the ICMetric module to either malfunction or give 
erroneous results. 
• The ICMetric basis number is never communicated to the 
outer world to further protect the system from unwanted 
exposure. 
The ICMetric ID is a number that is generated by 
combining unique device attributes. There are two techniques 
that are used for generating this number. The number size and 
stability are two important factors that are influenced by the 
choice of technique. The first technique is called the feature 
addition combination technique and is based on the addition of 
individual features of a device. This technique generates a 
number that is small in size yet more stable. On the other hand 
the feature concatenation- combination technique generates 
the ICMetric number through the concatenation operation. The 
generated number has the advantage of being long lengthed 
yet less stable. To generate the number both techniques 
undergo feature extraction along with the application of 
normalization maps [9]. 
Based on the advantages that ICMetrics has to offer 
researchers have proposed and have performed in depth 
studies on the many environments where ICMetrics can be 
implemented. Some of the recent advancements have been 
seen in electronic wheelchair security provision, cloud 
computing, wireless sensor networks, embedded systems, 
intrusion detection systems. 
VI. BUILDING BLOCKS 
Besides ICMetrics the admission control protocol is 
composed of some foundation blocks without which the 
security module cannot be considered secure. The essential 
modules are trapdoor functions, hashing. Both techniques are 
discussed below. 
A. Hash Functions 
Hash functions are frequently used in cryptography to 
convert an arbitrary length text input to a standard fixed 
length. The use of a hash function thus converts a length of 
text into seemingly random text outputs. This means that no 
matter how big the original text is the hash algorithm produces 
a single output of a relatively smaller length of text [10] [11]. 
Hashing has been used for many purposes like to verify if a 
file/ text has been modified. Another prominent use of hashing 
is to conceal data in situations where the data cannot be 
transmitted in its original form. The reason for preferring hash 
functions over encryption schemes is that encrypted text can 
be decrypted whereas hash functions are not reversible. 
Hashes possess unique properties owing to which they are 
considered secure. A prominent property of hash functions is 
that they are not reversible, secondly it should be infeasible to 
produce the original text if the hash is provided. A single text 
if passed through the hash algorithm multiple times (not 
repeatedly) should produce the same output hash. Although 
other secure properties also exist we have suggested the use of 
hash functions owing to the above properties. In our proposed 
admission control protocol we have passed the ICMetric 
number through a hash to prevent exposure of the ICMetric 
number. An added benefit that is also obtained is that the 
hashed ICMetric number cannot be used to identify the owner. 
This property preserves the identity and the opinion of clients 
regarding the admission of an intending member. 
B. Trap Door Functions 
A trapdoor function is a procedure that is simple to 
compute in one direction yet is difficult to compute it back 
(inverse) if only the result is provided. To find the inverse of a 
trapdoor function it is important that some critical information 
be given relating to the solution so that it can be properly 
reversed. Hence the trapdoor function is hard to inverse 
without the special information but easy to inverse if the 
special information is provided. Rivest et al in their work[6] 
have suggested the use of an extended trapdoor permutation. 
The basic trapdoor is RSA [13] based and allows a member 
having RSA public key    	 to specify a trapdoor 
permutation of 
 such that: 

	  	  (1) 
Consider  to be an extended trapdoor permutation over 
. For any input m defines non negative integers  and  
so that      The extended trapdoor permutation is 
dependent on the basic trapdoor permutation 
 over . Hence 
to solve the trapdoor permutation  it is important that the 
trapdoor permutation 
 be solved first. 
	    
	   	    !"#$%&'($  (2) 
VII. PROPOSED SCHEME 
A. Admission Request 
The admission procedure is initiated by an intending 
member)*. This member will request the group controller 
(GC) for permission to join the group. The admission request 
will be supported by a certificate of the intending member. 
This certificate will allow the members to verify the entity. 
B. Threshold Determination 
In the initial phase the group controller will determine the 
number of clients needed for voting. These clients should be 
selected randomly and the quantity called the threshold 
number+ should be optimized to reduce excessive 
communication overhead. In large sized groups this can be a 
problem because having a large sized population sample for 
polling can be both time and network intensive [12]. 
Once this has been determined it is the responsibility of the 
controller to determine the quorum which will give the 
number of favourable votes required. The quorum should not 
be taken as a percentage. If this is the case then in a large 
sample population the percentage is not an accurate indicator 
of acceptance. To highlight this consider a sample population 
of 200 voters. If we define the number of acceptable votes to 
be 80% then out of 200 the number of opposition votes is 40. 
Out of the 200 voters many clients may not vote or they may 
not vote in a timely manner. Hence it is evident that 40 
negative votes out of 200 is not a negligible number. Instead 
we recommend the use of an absolute number that is 
representative of the population’s opinion. Hence out of 200 
we recommend negative votes to be no more than 15. 
Although this may seem to be absurdly high but we must 
consider that the security of the entire group is at stake. While 
determining the threshold it must be clearly pointed out what 
will happen if the group population is too low to effectively 












Fig. 1. A prospective member ,* being voted by randomly selected 
existing group members 
 
C. Polling 
Once the group controller has determined the polling 
parameters it will send a polling request to the randomly 
selected members. The group members will first verify the 
correctness of the certificate. The voters will then cast either a 
positive or negative opinion and will forward this vote to the 
group controller. The individual members cannot 
communicate directly with an intending member. 
D. Ring Signature Generation 
The group controller will gather all the positive votes and will 
determine if the required quorum has been met. If the quorum 
has been met then the group controller proceeds forward with 
a ring signature generation. This ring signature will be 
generated by using the positive voters ICMetric number 
hashes. In our proposed protocol we have adapted the ring 
signature proposed by Rivest et al for our group admission 
control problem. Originally the use of the scheme for 
admission control has not been explored and secondly we 









56 GC Request 
If a group controller determines that the intending member 
should be given permission to enter the group then it will not 
send a message to the applicant. The problem with such 
schemes is that the message can be adapted resulting in an 
attack on the admission control protocol. Given the ICMetric 
number (78) hashes of those members that voted in favour of 
the admission. Each public key 9 specifies a trapdoor function 
with the properties discussed in section VI. The secret key :9 
holds information that can be used to compute ;9<0. The Ring 
signature generation will take place as follows. 
1) Symmetric key determination 
The group controller first generates a symmetric key by 
collecting the hashes of ICMetric numbers of those members 
that voted in favour of the intending member. After collecting 
the hashes a product is obtained of the collected hashes. 
=  > ?78	4@0    (3) 
Where A has a non-sequential value from 1 to +. 
2) Glue value generation 
The group controller will generate a random glue value B 
from . 
3) Pick random values of  
The group controller on its own generates a random value 
 from  on behalf of the group members that gave a 
positive vote. The selected value does not have to be 
communicated to the respective group members. The 
generated value is then used to solve the following equation 
for every positive voter. 
C9  ;9D9	 where  '  "  (4) 
4) Solve the ring equation 
The group controller solves the following ring equation for 
all the above generated values of E. 
FGHC0 C/I  C9	  JK where  '  "        (5) 
5) Trapdoor function inversion 
The group controller uses the trapdoor function to invert 
the values of ;9 and C9 to obtain D9. 
D9  ;9<0C9	, where  '  "  (6) 
6) Ring signature output 
The signature on the positive voters ICMetric number hash 
is defined to be the "  	 tuple: 
LM0 M/I  MNO JO D0 D/I DNP  (7) 
E. Ring Signature Verification 
An intending member may wish to verify the correctness 
of a signature. To do this Rivest et al propose the following 
steps. 
1) Apply the trapdoor permutations 
The verifier computes the following equation for 
C9  ;9D9	KwhereK  '  "  (8) 
2) Symmetric key computation 
The verifier computes the product of the ICMetric hashes 
to compute the symmetric key. 
=  >?78	   (9) 
3) Ring equation verification 
The verifier checks that the computed C9 satisfy the base 
equation 
8QRE0 E/I  E	  BKwhere  A  + (10) 
If the equation is satisfied then the verifier accepts the 
signature to be valid. 
VIII.  ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Admission control procedures form an important part of 
the secure communications. In group communications this is 
even more important as there is always room for welcoming 
new members into the group. Our proposed protocol is based 
on the latest ICMetrics technology which provides feature 
based key generation thus giving resilience against a wide 
range of attacks. The admission procedure is polling based 
thus preventing a single entity from making admissions on 
behalf of a group of clients. The polling procedure consists of 
a defined threshold and a quorum which is essential part of 
voting process. 
Once voting is complete it is the task of the group 
controller to inform the intending member that he has been 
granted permission to join the group. Most admission control 
protocols focus on the polling phase and the details regarding 
the identity of voters and their opinion is largely overlooked. 
Our proposed scheme informs an intending voter about the 
positive feedback without disclosing the identity and opinions 
of the voters. The admission scheme is based on the use of 
ring signatures that allow a person to leak a secret by signing 
but not linking the signature to his identity. In our particular 
scenario the document which needs to be communicated is the 
polling outcome and the ring signature is used to sign the 
document without using any key that is associated with the 
group. The ring signature is generated using an extended 
trapdoor function which increases the security stability of the 
scheme. The first step of the ring signature generation is the 
generation of a symmetric key. Our proposed scheme uses a 
product of ICMetrics hashes to generate the symmetric key. 
This technique firstly prevents the ICMetric number from 
being exposed and secondly the product further produces 
diffusion to eliminate any possibility of a pattern being 
exposed. The product has been taken so that the scheme can 
be used in very small groups. If the product was not used then 
the hashed ICMetric numbers would form the symmetric key 
which can be considered insecure. 
CONCLUSION 
Security in a group cannot be certified until there is a 
formal admission control procedure. Traditionally most 
research has been geared towards post admission activities and 
hence admission control has been largely overlooked. 
Admission control defines a set of procedures that come into 
play when a client needs to be admitted into a secure group 
communication. A client can be given access to a group by 
voting, use of access control list or by invitation. The choice 
of technique depends upon the level of security and the 
membership policy that governs the group. In this paper we 
discussed three types of groups that can be formed for group 
communications. The most common admission control is 
based on the use of polling. This allows a group of clients to 
vote for a particular intending member. The advantage that 
polling has over other techniques is that it allows a collection 
of clients to vote on behalf of the entire group. This results in 
a reduction in the communication overhead and at the same 
time prevents a single entity from making decisions on behalf 
of many existing members. 
Our proposed admission scheme allows a group controller 
to generate a right of admission by using ICMetrics and ring 
signatures. The role of ICMetrics is that it prevents fraudulent 
entities from casting votes and hence influencing the polling 
procedure. The proposed scheme uses a combination of 
hashing, RSA based trapdoor permutation and extended 
trapdoor permutations to generate a signature that can be used 
to sign a right of admission without exposing the identity and 
opinion of the clients involved in polling for admission. This 
scheme can be considered secure owing to the use of trapdoors 
and hashing. To provide security to the intending member the 
generated resulting ring equation is verifiable. 
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